Certificate Decoder
Paste or open a certificate, chain, or CSR to see every field, check chain order and signatures, and test host-name coverage. Decoded in your browser.
Where your data goes
| Using this page | Using the API, MCP or A2A | |
|---|---|---|
| Where it runs |
In your browser. Decoding and signature checks run in the page with @peculiar/x509 and Web Crypto. The page makes no network requests, so it never contacts OCSP responders, CRL servers or the certificate's issuer URLs. | In a Cloudflare Pages Function at the Cloudflare data centre nearest the caller. |
| What leaves your device | Nothing you enter. After the page and its scripts load, no request
carries your input. The browser enforces this: the page's Content-Security-Policy
sets connect-src 'none' and form-action 'none', which
block fetch, XHR, WebSocket, EventSource, beacons and form posts.
| The server receives the certificate data, decodes it in memory, and returns the decoded fields. Certificates and CSRs are public by design, but the input is not stored or logged (only the per-call metadata row is recorded). The server makes no network requests (it does not fetch OCSP, CRLs or issuer certificates). Private keys in the input are rejected. |
| Stored | Nothing leaves the page. No cookies, analytics or third-party scripts; the browser keeps only your View → Inline config choice. | Your inputs and results: never. What is stored is your client record (client ID, a SHA-256 hash of your secret, expiry, and the profile you registered with) and one metadata row per call: operation, time, transport, status, error code, duration, request and response sizes, and country. |
| Logged | Nothing (no requests are made). | Only the per-call metadata above, attributed to your client ID. Never parameters, bodies, results, or credentials. Cloudflare, as the host, also processes request metadata (IP address, full URL including the query string, headers) under its own policies, so put inputs in POST bodies. |
| Access | Open to anyone. | Requires a client ID and secret (how to get one). HTTPS only; TLS terminates at Cloudflare. |
Details and how to verify this yourself: Security & privacy.
User guide
The tool sits in a window that works like a desktop app: menus on the top row and the full-screen icon at its right (Esc leaves full screen). The set-up options described below are in Settings → Options…, an overlay, and the Settings menu also lists the common choices directly. To keep the options in view instead, choose View → Inline config; the page remembers that choice. Help → Keyboard shortcuts… lists the keys.
- Paste one or more PEM blocks, or open a file:
.pem,.crt,.cer, binary.der, a.p7bbundle, or a.csr. - Optionally enter a host name to check whether the certificate covers it.
- Read the cards. There is one per certificate, labelled Leaf, Intermediate CA or Root (self-signed), plus one per CSR.
Checking a server’s chain. Paste the chain in the order the server sends it, leaf first. The summary tells you whether each certificate is signed by the next one, flags gaps or wrong order, and notes expired certificates. A typical healthy server chain is leaf → intermediate, without the root.
Getting a server’s chain (on your own machine):
openssl s_client -connect example.com:443 -servername example.com -showcerts </dev/null
Paste everything between and including the BEGIN/END CERTIFICATE lines.
Checking a CSR before sending it to a CA. Paste the CERTIFICATE REQUEST. Confirm the subject, the SANs and the key type. Signature valid proves the request was made by whoever holds the matching private key.
What this does not tell you. A chain that “looks correct” here is structurally sound. Whether it is trusted depends on the client’s root store, and whether it has been revoked depends on OCSP/CRL. This tool checks neither. Use your browser,
openssl verify -CAfile …, or an online TLS scanner for those.
Specification
Input.
- PEM labels:
CERTIFICATE,X509 CERTIFICATE,PKCS7,CERTIFICATE REQUESTandNEW CERTIFICATE REQUEST, in any number and order. - Other forms: raw DER (from a file), or Base64 DER pasted without armor.
- Private keys: input containing any
PRIVATE KEYblock is rejected.
Certificate fields.
| Field | Source |
|---|---|
| Subject, issuer | RFC 4514 string form of the distinguished names |
| Validity | notBefore/notAfter. Status (valid, expired, not yet valid) and whole days remaining are evaluated at the current time (the API’s at parameter overrides it) |
| Subject alternative names | DNS, IP, email, URI, directory name and other GeneralName types |
| Public key | Algorithm, size (RSA modulus bits or curve), RFC 7469 SPKI pin |
| Signature | Algorithm and hash, e.g. RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 with SHA-256, ECDSA with SHA-384, Ed25519 |
| Key usage / extended key usage | RFC 5280 §4.2.1.3 / §4.2.1.12, with common purposes named |
| Basic constraints | CA flag and path length |
| Policies | OIDs, with CA/Browser Forum DV/OV/IV/EV policies named |
| AIA, CRL distribution points | OCSP and CA-issuer URLs; CRL URLs (shown, never fetched) |
| SCTs | Whether Certificate Transparency SCTs are embedded (OID 1.3.6.1.4.1.11129.2.4.2) |
| Fingerprints | SHA-256 and SHA-1 over the DER |
Chain checks. For each adjacent pair (certificate n, certificate n+1):
- The issuer name of n must equal the subject name of n+1, compared as the RFC 4514 string.
- The signature on n must verify with the public key of n+1, using Web Crypto.
The last certificate is reported as a root if it is self-signed: its subject equals its issuer and it verifies with its own key.
Host-name check.
- Rules: RFC 6125 §6.4. Case-insensitive; a wildcard is allowed only as the entire left-most label and matches exactly one label (
*.example.commatchesa.example.com, but notexample.comora.b.example.com). - Names checked: only DNS SANs. The subject CN is ignored, as modern clients do.
CSRs (RFC 2986). The decoder reports the subject, the requested SANs (from the extensionRequest attribute), the public key, and whether the self-signature verifies.
Not performed. Trust-anchor validation, revocation checking, name constraints, policy processing, and Certificate Transparency log lookups.
API & MCP
The same logic is available over HTTP and as MCP tools. Unlike this page, these run on the server: see where your data goes.